Research concluding that the introduction of Threshold pay points for teachers improved pupil performance by on average half a grade for pupils of eligible teachers. This despite arguments beforehand that teachers were professionals with a service culture and would not respond to financial incentives. Counterpoint to pre-seen material argument that professional control is adequate.

Also makes the point that the threshold system is not that rigorous – most applicant were successful. But teachers beforehand believed that it would be challenging, making it real.

Behavoural implications: Because of the complexity of the measurement system, parents fixate on %5A*-C. As a result head teachers fixate on this measure, in their roles as marketers of their schools. Resources are then targetted on borderline C-D students. They feel that more complex, value-added measures will not replace the simpler result measure in the minds of parents. Also worth noting that heads are not using the externally reported measures internally – bit of a disconnect.

Research on GP QOF incentive scheme indicates that there is evidence of GPs manipulating their figures by increasing the number of patients reported as excepted from treatment. Also, it appears that in areas for which there is data, achievement was trending upwards before the introduction of QOF and QOF has had very modest impact – evidence that a rigid performance scheme will not deliver high quality results from groups already governed by strong social, self and professional controls.

Negative behavioural consequences of PM schemes. E.g. tendency to be risk averse. Some pupils were prevented from taking part in extra-curricular activities for fear of harming exam results. Eton College and St. Pauls have refused to submit their results in future.

Historically, the NHS has been data-rich but information poor. The World-class Commissioning agenda will require the harnessing of the data to support planning, benchmarking, monitoring and financial management.

Secondary Uses Service to support management and provide data to public through NHS website.

A different kind of target – an ambitious target can be an inspirational statement of principal and purpose rather than a drab management tool.

Median waiting times have increased even though average waiting times have fallen, due to focus on the patients who had been waiting the longest. Example of misleading performance info. The 18 week target should bring median down in future.

Sickness and injury in the army. This kind of performance data is clearly useful as it impacts directly on ability to deliver objectives. This information allows management, not just measurement.

Evidence that publicly published performance results do improve performance. Especially since requirements for higher grades have moved upwards since CPA introduced.

New PSAs designed around people and projects, not departments. Cabinet committees reorganised to be aligned with the PSAs, with chairs to resolve conflicts. Evidence of more relational approach – structures to facilitate interaction and cooperation.