Child poverty reduction target likely to fall short by 1 million (PF 7/3/08)

A different kind of target – an ambitious target can be an inspirational statement of principal and purpose rather than a drab management tool.

One in 14 soldiers is unfit to fight (PF 8/2/08)

Sickness and injury in the army. This kind of performance data is clearly useful as it impacts directly on ability to deliver objectives. This information allows management, not just measurement.

Cracking the code, by Dick Sorabji (PF 25/1/08)

New PSAs designed around people and projects, not departments. Cabinet committees reorganised to be aligned with the PSAs, with chairs to resolve conflicts. Evidence of more relational approach – structures to facilitate interaction and cooperation.

Some mandarins merely ‘going through the motions on DCRs’ (PF 16/11/07)

While DCRs more robust than expected, some departments are not following up on recommendations, with most buying in only selectively. Principal factor is leadership style of Permanent Secretary. If recommendations aren’t delivered, is only measurement, not management.

Burnham defends new PSAs as ‘a genuine reduction in targets’ (PF 26/10/07)

Observation that the 30 new PSAs plus the 103 departmental strategy objectives comes to a total larger than the current 110 PSAs.

Doing the maths, by Joseph McHugh (PF 5/10/07)

Article on October CSR. Use of hard financial targets e.g. Gershon efficiency savings. Given sharper edge by the harsher financial settlement that public services received from this CSR.

Also, move to smaller number of ‘joined up’ PSA targets, cutting across issues.

News analysis – Learning curves for the DfES mandarins (PF 8/12/06)

Response to DCR in DfES. Three priority areas for improvement: people management, departmental strategy and clarification of civil service and ministers’ roles in delivery.

Improving ability to consult and get quick feedback from frontline staff. Recognising need to work with bodies sitting beneath it. Introduction of stricter HR management with clear roles and accountabilities.

Performance anxiety, by Colin Talbot and Carole Johnson (PF 12/1/07)

Problems with PSAs:

1. Data quality – many departments do not have systems in place which are capable of accurately monitoring their PSA targets.

2. Accountability – the goal is to make public services more accountable, but it is questionable whether this has happened. Does anyone pay attention to the results? Select committees are not making great use of them.

3. What do they mean? Where do the targets come from? E.g. why 50% participation target for higher education?

4. Lack of resources to analyse the data.

Intention: Transactional – funding in exchange for performance.

Who’s the weakest link now? By Colin Talbot (PF 4/8/06)

Discussion of DCRs of Whitehall departments. Were expected to be toothless – Whitehall inspecting itself – but first results were scathing. Didn’t examine actual performance but were forward-looking and considered capability in terms of Leadership, Strategy and Delivery.

Measuring and Managing Performance in the Royal Air Force (www.ap-institute.com)

Why measure?

Accountable management – Measure performance objectively and hold individuals to account

Procurement management – RAF has long procurement lead times so need to be on top of current force readiness as quickly as possible.

Response – When the RAF is required to respond, it needs to know what resources it had to act with.

Reporting

Scorecard approach, with top line indicators for commanders, but allowing drill down to the raw data. Four perspectives: Outputs, Resources, Processes and Future Capabilities. Outputs were analysed along pre-existing Defence Lines of Delivery. Indicators arranged in a hierarchy, feeding up to the top level. Rules agreed for consolidation based on user requirements e.g. best case, worst cased etc.

Originally used Powerpoint/Word for reporting, but moved to an automated database backed application, integrating Performance Management with Risk Management, Supplier Management. Resource management will be added in the future.

Indicators

Originally focussed on subjective judgements, but this made investigation very difficult. Moved to more objective measures over time, retaining subjective measures where appropriate e.g. morale, fighting spirit. Present automatically calculated picture alongside an alternate view taking into account local commanders’ views to get a comprehensive picture.

Implementation

Large number of dispersed users resulted in significant training requirements. A computer-based training course was developed and the courses were supported by a web site and briefings to keep people up to date.

A dedicated implementation team was set up. They owned the long-term vision of the project, managed development, provided help-desk and training and maintained momentum.

Overcoming scepticism was an issue as the military have cultural reluctance to embrace the science of management, considering it inappropriate in their special circumstances. Support from the Commander in Chief helped mitigate this, as did focus on the benefits of the system. Staff movement made things difficult – people would be persuaded, then move on and their replacement would need persuaded.

Areas to address

Making sure everyone benefits from the data, especially stations which at present provide a lot of data but receive little.

Integration and alignment of performance and resource management. Matching cost data to performance.